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die Freiheit in ihrer "spielerischen" Form beim Schonen, die Freiheit in ihrer "ern-
sten" Form beim Erhabenen (also beide Freiheitsformen der Einbildungskraft), und 
schlielSlich die Freiheit in der "tragischen" Form der Willktir. Wenn die zwei letzte-
ren in der "Aufopferung" ihren gemeinsamen Zug haben, taucht bei der Willkiir 
aulSerdem auf iiberraschende Weise ein typischer Zug der Freiheit der Schonheit 
wieder auf, namlich das Dberschreiten der GesetzmalSigkeit: Durch die Suche des 
"hochste[n] in der Welt mogliche[n] Gut[es]", die in der (fiir die Willkur entschei-
dende) Liebe wurzelt, "erweitert sich" die praktische Vernunft tiber das Gesetz hin-
aus (vgl. Ak VI, 7). Dabei lassen sich, so Chiereghin, "die formalen Kennzeichen 
der Freiheit der Einbildungskraft" wieder erkennen (206). So werden drei Faden 
zusammengeflochten, die Kant explizit nicht verbunden hatte, deren Zusammen-
hang aber ein neues Licht erzeugt. Durch die Herausstellung dieser nicht zu erzwin-
genden "Liebe zur Freiheit" (207) wird ein Kant-Bild entworfen, in dem zwar der 
sogenannte "tragische" Kant im Vordergrund bleibt, der angeblich "rigoristische" 
und "formalistische" Philosoph jedoch nicht mehr zu sehen ist. In dies em Portrait in 
den Farben der Liebe zur Freiheit hatte sich Kant ohne Zweifel gerne wiedererkannt. 
Claudio La Rocca, Pis a 
Kenneth Baynes: The Normative Grounds of Social Criticism: Kant, Rawls, and 
Habermas. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992. 
Baynes's two main objectives are to show that Kant, Rawls, and Habermas share 
the view that "the idea of an agreement among free and equal persons [i. e., autono-
mous persons] ... constitutes the normative ground of social criticism" (p. 8), and 
that this "constructivist" view is more adequately developed and defended with 
each successive theorist. The study, however, goes beyond these aims and can often 
fruitfully be read as a comparative study of Rawls and Habermas. Baynes discusses 
Kant's theory of justice, Rawls's justice as fairness, and Habermas's discourse ethics 
in the first three chapters, respectively. In the remaining two chapters, he seeks to 
show that Habermas's view is in many ways superior to Rawls's. His final conclu-
sion is that social criticism requires a "deliberative democracy" centered around 
Habermas's model of the public sphere (p. 181). 
In his chapter on Kant, Baynes argues that autonomy is the foundation of Kant's 
theory of justice (and, hence, of his social criticism) in that he held that just laws 
are those that can meet the consent of free and equal persons. Baynes considers 
some challenges to his view, one of which is Yirmiahu Yovel's argument in K.ant 
and the Philosophy of History (1980) that Kant saw the task of organizing a just 
state as "merely a problem in political technology" (p. 188). Yovel bases his argu-
ment on Kant's statement in Toward Perpetual Peace (Ak VIII/366) that even a 
nation' of devils can bring about the republican state if they are smart enough. The 
implication is that instrumental reason, or intelligent self-interest, suffices as the 
foundation of the just state. One way in which Baynes seeks to meet this argument 
is by rejecting Kant's teleologicalinterpretation of history, rightly claiming that the 
statement about the nation of devils must be placed in the context of Kant's notion 
of a "providentially guided nature" (pp. 12,23,47). Baynes rejects Kant's teleologi-
cal view of history at several other places, arguing that it has a negative impact on 
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his justification of property rights (see below) and that it made him trust in reform 
"from above" rather than support revolutionary action "from below" (pp. 46, 
185n.5). It is true that Kant's idea of progress established through self-interest alone 
raises some problems for his political thought, but Baynes fails to note that this 
idea is regulative and meant to support hope and moral praxis. More generally, it 
should be recognized that Kant's philosophy of history unifies the critical system 
and offers important moral reflections on our fate as historical beings. 
Baynes elaborates his thesis that autonomy is the cornerstone of Kant's Rechts-
lehre in a fine discussion of his contractarian justification of the right to property, 
comparing it with Locke's account. He concludes: "According to Locke, in the state 
of nature property rights are absolute and the sole end of government is to protect 
and preserve natural rights. For Kant, by contrast, property rights remain provi-
sional until the formation of a civil society and, strictly speaking, until the creation 
of a federal league of nations" (p. 39). Baynes finds Kant's view an improvement 
over Locke's but nonetheless rejects it because it "implicitly relies upon a teleologi-
cal conception of history" (p. 48). His point seems to be that on Kant's terms one 
can only view one's property rights as not unjust if one assumes that they will meet 
the consent of all nations at some future moment in history. However, a significant 
critical conclusion can be drawn instead: Kant intended to stress the provisional 
nature of property rights in his time because he condemned colonialism. Accord-
ingly, Baynes's contention that "the nature or form of property rights [in Kant] 
never actually becomes subject to public debate and agreement [as in Habermas]" 
is of debatable merit (p. 48). Further, Baynes's rejection of Kant's historical teleol-
ogy leads him to neglect another crucial distinction between Kant and Locke: Kant 
transcended Locke's "possessive individualism" by making moral emancipation, or 
the kingdom of ends, the ultimate purpose of the liberal state. 
For Baynes, we must go beyond Kant not only because his historical teleology is 
objectionable but also because his notion of autonomy is monological, based on a 
sharp opposition between reason and needs, and rooted in an untenable two-world 
metaphysics. Baynes here follows Habermas (p. 111), who overstresses his case. 
The picture of the moral agent in the Grundlegung tells only part of the story; a 
richer picture emerges in }he First and Third Critiques and the historical essays, 
where communication and the historical transformation of needs become part of 
moral praxis. Baynes holds that a final major reason to transcend Kant is his claim 
that the moral law is given as a fact of pure reason. On his account, Habermas 
offers a good alternative with his derivation of his principle of universalizability 
from the pragmatic presuppositions of speech and argumentation (pp. 112 ff.). 
The next chapter on Rawls is primarily interpretive and pays most attention to 
his work prior to the political conception of justice. Baynes perceptively argues that 
many early critics of Rawls failed to fully recognize his Kantianism because they 
did not see that "the original position taken as a whole - not just the description 
of the rationality of the parties - represents, in a procedural device, Kant's notion 
of autonomy" (p.53). His main criticism of Rawls at this juncture concerns the 
justification of the two principles of justice through the process of reaching a reflec-
tive equilibrium. Baynes states: "Why should we regard the principles as justified 
unless it is our beliefs that have been brought into a condition 'of reflective equilib-
rium as a result of a process in which we participated?" (p.74). He concludes 
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that this justificatory requirement of "actual participation" indicates that Rawlsian 
constructivism becomes more acceptable when it is "pushed" in the direction of 
Habermas's discourse ethics (p.76). 
After a rich expository chapter on Habermas, Baynes rebuts some critics who 
reject Rawls's conception of persons altogether, including the communitarians 
Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor. His own sympathies lie with critics like Ha-
bermas, who accept Rawls's understanding of autonomy but reject its specific rep-
resentation in the original position. Here Baynes returns to his objection that Rawls 
does not offer "actual participation" as the basis of justification, but now the target 
is Rawls's formulation of a list of primary social goods that must guide the deci-
sion-making in the original position and provide a basis for judging the fairness of 
the basic structure of society. Baynes contends that "in severing the list of primary 
goods from a notion of what all could .agree to [in a free debate], Rawls once 
more unnecessarily privileges the external perspective of the philosopher" (p. 148). 
Habermas's alternative is to base social criticism on the notion of "generalizable 
interests," which are interests that express the common good and are accepted by 
all in a free debate. This poses the problem that no guideline is offered in the 
absence of actual debates. Baynes describes the solution: "Habermas's proposal is 
... to carry out virtual or counterfactual discourses to help differentiate between 
generalizable and nongeneralizable interests, thereby identifying areas where real 
generalizable interests have been suppressed" (p. 150). Baynes calls this the" 'advo-
cacy' role of the critical social theorist" (p. 150), but how does it differ from the 
contested external perspective of the Rawlsian philosopher? Moreover, Baynes here 
undermines his earlier criticism that Rawls's justification of his principles of justice 
is unconvincing without our actual participation. 
To clarify these issues, a distinction drawn by Philip Pettit between distributive 
and collective consensus is helpful. [See Habermas on Truth and Justice, )n: Marx 
and Marxisms (1982), ed. by G. H. R. Parkinson.] A distributive consensus is 
reached when each person of a group assents to a norm, whether or not after 
discussion'with others. A collective consensus is reached when a group discusses a 
norm and then together agree to the norm. Initially, it seems that Baynes rejects 
Rawls because he defends his principles of justice through the device of counterfac-' 
tual consensus. However, since Habermas's social theorist also proceeds counterfac-
tually, we should conclude that Baynes's real objection is that Rawls seeks only 
distributive consensus, while Habermas aims at collective consensus. Thus, roughly 
speaking, the Rawlsian philosopher would say that the statement that some norm 
is just involves that each individual would assent to it under some suitable condi-
tions of choice, whereas Habermas's social theorist would say that it would be 
affirmed by a group in a free dialogue. Baynes objects to the Rawlsian perspective 
as a "privileged position" of the philosopher (p. 146), but in either perspective there 
is a similar attempt to convince the reader of what would be chosen by rational 
agents. He further claims that Habermas's social theorist will see her proposals as 
"tentative" or "fallible" (p. 151), but Rawls does not deny that his principles of 
justice are subject to revision. 
Baynes holds that the crucial difference between the two perspectives concerns 
their institutional implications. He writes: "[T]he idea of agreement [in HabermasJ 
must not remain wholly counterfactual. Rather, a central task of critical social 
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theory is to identify ways in which this ideal can be institutionalized within an 
actually functioning public sphere" (pp. 6-7). Of course, Rawls also seeks a society 
of actual agreement concerning his principles of justice, but Baynes maintains that 
"insofar as a discourse ethics requires that the validity of social norms be tested in 
actual discourses [aiming at collective consensus] rather than through monologi-
cally conducted thought experiments [which suffice for distributivs consensus], 
[Habermas] emphasizes more strongly than ... Rawls the need to encourage and 
maintain a wide array of institutions that together constitute an active and robust 
public sphere" (p. 6). Baynes seems correct that Habermas's ethics requires the insti-
tutionalization of discourse, but it should be noted that Rawls's model of distribu-
tive consensus as such does not preclude that he also would have argued for a 
strong public sphere. After all, this model only concerns his two principles of jus-
tice, leaving room for many norms, policies, etc., that may need to be debated in 
the public sphere. Baynes's valuable study would have gained from a systematic 
and detailed defense of why he thinks that reaching collective consensus is always 
superior to reaching distributive consensus, both counterfactually and actually. 
A final problem is why discourse should take place primarily in the public sphere. 
In his concluding chapter, Baynes shows that Habermas sees in our society the 
potential for a "reconstituted civil society" or "posttraditional public sphere" 
(p. 176), in which the "formation of public opinion ... takers] place within informal 
institutions or 'secondary associations' that are sufficiently shielded from the colo-
nizing effects of the capitalist economy and administrative state" (p. 178). Rejecting 
both pluralist and neo-corporatist theories of democracy, Baynes proposes that this 
enlarged public sphere can be the basis for a "deliberative democracy" in that the 
debate and resulting social criticism of citizens in the secondary associations can 
influence the political agenda and decision-making of official parliamentary bodies. 
In my view, these associations of communicative rationality are not enough; what 
is also required for the realization of a truly democratic society of autonomous 
agents is that the totalizing eco~omic and political subsystems are democratized 
from within. A Kantian proposal in this direction can be found in the works of 
Hermann Cohen and other democratic socialists of the Marburg School. 
Harry van der Linden, Indianapolis 
